我国建设监理执业行为及行业委托代理机制的优化研究

发布时间：2018-01-07 01:27

本文关键词：我国建设监理执业行为及行业委托代理机制的优化研究　出处：《西安建筑科技大学》2013年博士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：借鉴于西方的建设监理制度25年来为我国工程建设综合管理水平的提高发挥了巨大作用，但监理人员素质低下、责任心不强、注册人员数量不足的行业问题始终未能解决。本文紧密结合工程实践对影响监理执业的制度框架、组织体系和相关主体的利益最大化行为进行分析，修正“经济人”假设，将监理人员所受的传统观念约束纳入西方经济学理论框架，充分考虑我国“和谐中庸”、“重义轻利”与“无讼是求”等传统观念对监理制度运行的深刻影响，根据中西方文化差异，，把文化观念约束细分为“竞争”与“和谐”、“重义轻利”与“重利轻义”两个维度，将监理人员分为竞争式努力尽职、竞争式权力寻租、和谐式努力尽职与和谐式权力寻租4种类型，拓展并修正层级代理理论的P-S-A模型，对监理人员基于项目主管代理人行为导向的三类八种执业模式进行规范性研究后认为：在项目法人或承包商为了自身利益最大化必然采取有限度质量违规策略的前提下，监理人员受传统文化观念影响难以选择“独立”和“尽职”两种最符合社会公众工程质量安全利益的执业行为模式，而是无奈选择“默许”、“无讼”、“放任”三种执业行为模式，各类工程事故并非监理人员主观故意以“敲诈”、“合谋”、“同谋”违规执业模式谋取寻租利益所致。文章对国内重大工程事故判决法律卷宗和相关工程事故调查结论进行实证分析，证明监理人员通常采取“默许”、“无讼”、“放任”三种执业行为模式，说明强制监理制度客观上是一种强迫监理人员在工程验收环节“说假话”的机制，是对项目法人或承包商质量安全违规行为的“不可置信威胁”。本文依据研究结论对监理机制进行优化设计，建议立法允许监理人员对工程或工序验收出具“不合格”的评价意见，实施监理有条件免责机制和以承包商的质量安全履约保证金对监理“说真话”损失的补偿机制，能有效地将强制监理制度转变为“可置信威胁”，扭转工程领域验收环节集体“说假话”的现状，迅速建立承包商的市场声誉机制，彻底杜绝“非合格”工程与工程事故的出现。文章运用博弈论对监理企业派驻无资质人员开展监理业务的的利益最大化行为进行规范性分析，并利用监理行业有关统计数据进行实证研究，说明监理企业是监理行业人员数量不足、素质低下的获利推手。文章建议本着客观务实的原则，通过立法允许有一定专业资质的非注册人员进行监理执业并赋予其签字权来建立监理企业的行为显示机制，立法由监理协会获取部分监理酬金的歧视性收益分配规则，和由监理企业法定代表人代替非注册从业人员承担包括刑事责任在内的全部法律责任的事故责任分担机制，能够有效地促进监理行业整体素质的快速提高。
[Abstract]:In the past 25 years, the construction supervision system in the west has played a great role in improving the comprehensive management level of engineering construction in China, but the quality of the supervisors is low and the sense of responsibility is not strong. The problem of an industry with an insufficient number of registered personnel has never been resolved. This article closely combines the engineering practice to analyze the system frame, the organization system and the benefit maximization behavior of the related subjects, and to revise the hypothesis of "economic man". By bringing the constraints of the traditional concepts to the supervisors into the theoretical framework of western economics, the author fully considers the profound influence on the operation of the supervision system by the traditional concepts such as "harmonious and moderate", "emphasizing justice and light interests" and "seeking without litigation". According to the cultural differences between China and the West, the restriction of cultural concept is divided into two dimensions: "competition" and "harmony", "emphasizing justice over profit" and "emphasizing profit and interests". It extends and modifies the P-S-A model of hierarchical agent theory by four types of competitive power rent-seeking, harmonious effort diligence and harmonious power rent-seeking. Based on the normative study of three types and eight kinds of practice models based on the agent behavior orientation of the project supervisor, the author holds that:. In order to maximize their own interests, the project legal person or contractor must adopt limited quality violation strategy. Under the influence of traditional cultural concept, supervisors are unable to choose "independence" and "due diligence", which are the two most consistent with the social public engineering quality and safety interests, but reluctantly choose "acquiescence" and "no litigation". "laissez-faire" three modes of practice, all kinds of engineering accidents are not subjective and deliberate "extortion" and "collusion" of supervisors. The article makes an empirical analysis on the legal files of the domestic major engineering accident judgment and the investigation conclusion of the related engineering accident, and proves that the supervisor usually adopts "acquiescence". "No lawsuit", "laissez-faire" three kinds of practice behavior patterns, it shows that the compulsory supervision system is objectively a mechanism to force supervisors to "lie" in the link of project acceptance. Is the project legal person or contractor quality and safety violations of the "unbelievable threat." Based on the conclusion of the research, this paper optimizes the design of supervision mechanism, and suggests that legislation should be made to allow supervisors to issue "unqualified" evaluation opinions on the acceptance of projects or processes. The implementation of the supervision conditional exemption mechanism and the compensation mechanism of the contractor's "telling the truth" loss with the contractor's quality and safety performance bond can effectively transform the compulsory supervision system into a "credible threat". To reverse the situation of collective falsehood in the acceptance link of engineering field, to establish the contractor's market reputation mechanism quickly, and to put an end to the emergence of "non-qualified" engineering and engineering accidents. This paper applies game theory to the normative analysis of the maximization of the benefits of the supervision enterprises in which unqualified personnel are assigned to carry out supervision work, and makes an empirical study using the relevant statistical data of the supervision industry. It shows that the supervision enterprise is a profit-maker with insufficient number of personnel and low quality in the supervision profession. The article suggests the principle of objectivity and pragmatism. Through legislation to allow non-registered personnel with certain professional qualifications to practice supervision and give them the right to sign to establish the supervision enterprise behavior display mechanism. Legislation by the supervision association to obtain part of the supervision of the remuneration of discriminatory income distribution rules. The mechanism of sharing the responsibility of accident by the legal representative of the supervision enterprise instead of the unregistered employees, including the criminal liability, can effectively promote the rapid improvement of the overall quality of the supervision industry.
【学位授予单位】：西安建筑科技大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F203;F426.92

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