公司实际控制人与股东利益冲突的寓言解读——实际控制人、股东、收购者的博弈

发布时间：2019-03-16 17:04

【摘要】：收购对股东来说意味着丰厚的股票溢价,而对公司实际控制人来说,则可能意味着失去公司管理权。在收购中,股东利益与公司实际控制人的利益很可能背道而驰。如何协调这一利益冲突是公司治理的难题。针对该问题,各国立法将收购防御措施分为前期防御策略和后期防御策略来分别规制。我国最新的《上市公司收购管理办法》对收购问题只有后期策略规制,而缺少前期策略的规制立法,这就等于实际控制人可以利用公司的投票结构,在公司章程中注入条款以排斥收购,限制他人的股票权利。这不得不说是法律的空白。本文针对该技术性很强的商法问题,利用最浅显的寓言故事和博弈学的分析方法,解构了利用章程反收购的方法对公司、股东、董事利益的影响,从而为理解优化治理、提高公司管理和资源利用效率提供一个崭新的切入角度。
[Abstract]:A takeover would mean a substantial share premium for shareholders, and a loss of management for the company's actual controller. In the acquisition, the interests of shareholders and the actual control of the company are likely to run counter to the interests. How to coordinate this conflict of interest is a difficult problem of corporate governance. In view of this problem, various countries legislate to divide the acquisition defense measures into pre-defense strategy and post-defense strategy respectively. The latest "Management measures for the acquisition of listed companies" in China has only the late strategic regulation on the acquisition problem, but the lack of legislation on the regulation of the early strategy means that the actual controller can make use of the voting structure of the company. Inject terms into the articles of association to exclude acquisitions and limit the rights of others to stock. This has to be said to be a gap in the law. Aiming at this technical commercial law problem, using the most obvious allegory story and game analysis method, this paper deconstructs the influence of the anti-acquisition method of articles of association on the interests of company, shareholders and directors, so as to optimize governance for understanding, Improving the efficiency of corporate management and resource utilization provides a new cut-in angle.
【作者单位】：山东大学经济研究中心;山东大学法学院;
【分类号】：D922.291.91

【共引文献】